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JURISDICTION OF THF COuRi > APPEALS 
Thi 
Board of Review's decision. Jurisdiction is proper pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated 35-4-10(1)(1990), 78-2a-3(2)(a)(1990), and Article Eight of the 
COf'ISt it U * "!i»i I » 11*-' SI d» "J 'll (J I J IK , . . . ' . 
STATEMENT OF 1 HE 155! IES .. 
Is there substantial evidence in the record to support the Board of 
Review's decision that Mi Wagstaff was terminated for just cause after he 
Aircraft Mechanic? 
S'Ar IB OF RF-VIFW 
The Standard of Review '- w s matter is that set forth in Utah Code 
Annotated 63-46b-16(4) m o cuui i may reverse the Board of Review only if 
it finds l.hal igency's determination not support by substantia I evidence in 
the record. 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
This case is governed by the law set forth at Utah Code Annotated 
35-4-5 (Addendum 1 dministxauvi' Kuih . -
a Culpability 
This is the seriousness of the conduct or the severity 
of the offense as it affects continuance of the employ-
ment relationship. The discharge must have been 
necessary to avoid actual or potential harm to the 
employer's rightful interests. A discharge would not 
be considered "necessary" if it is not consistent with 
reasonable employment practices. The wrongness of the 
conduct must be considered in the context of the par-
ticular employment and how it affects the employer's 
rights. If the conduct was an isolated incident of 
poor judgement and there is no expectation that the 
conduct will be continued or repeated, potential harm 
may not be shown and therefore it is not necessary to 
discharge the employee. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND RELEVANT FACTS 
The petitioner, Dennis L. Wagstaff, was employed by the Air Force as 
an Aircraft Mechanic (R 5). On his lunch hour, he left Hill Air Force Base, 
used cocaine, and then returned to work (R 144, 145). The Air Force 
initiated an investigation of his activities, (R 36-44), and then terminated 
him (R 5-10). Mr. Wagstaff applied for unemployment benefits which were 
ultimately denied by the Board of Review (R 222-226). He seeks review of 
the Board's decision (R 229). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This court must uphold the decision of the Board of Review since it was 
based upon substantial evidence. Mr. Wagstaff was culpable since his actions 
were inimical to his employer's interests. The evidence upon which the Board 
relied was not hearsay, but admissions against interest by a party to the 
action. Mr. Wagstaff was not entitled to rehabilitation by his employer. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
WAGSTAFF WAS CULPABLE 
2 
.... • . • . A 
WAGSTAFF WAS A PHYSICAL THREAl 10 DP. FMPt OYER 
Wagstaff argues he was not culpable and correctly cites Rule 475-5b-102 
of the Utah Administrative Rules as governing h.j case, 
"a. Cu Ipabi lity 
This is the seriousness of the conduct or the severity of 
the offense as it affects continuance of the employment 
relationship. The discharge must have been necessary to 
avoid actual or potential harm to the employer's rightful 
interests." 
This court has previously agreed with the Air Force on the interest• before 
the i utjr t in I In •» mailer. 
"We agree with the Air Force that its interest in 
preventing drug use among its workforce is paramount. 
This interest is especially imperative considering the 
sensitive nature of Butler's activities as an aircraft 
mechanic working on multi-million dollar aircraft." 
Deot of Air Force v. Deot of Emo. Sec, 786 P.2d P.2d 1361, 1364 N.3 (Jtan 
App, 1990) (The Butler r a(u») liir i*l legations wlmh IHII tn Wagstaf 's 
termination are that he consumed cocaine during his lunch hour, immediately 
before returning to his employment as an aircraft mechanic. < dmitted 
having ilum |H Lib l«k., M l , 144, 141, 15b, Ib8, lb9, — !64. 181 
183, 184, 187, 188, 190, 192.) 
At the hearing the A ir force elicited testimony t>om Agent EMim of the 
Office • I "")|iiei, idil Investigations as to the effect of cocaine on those who 
ingest it (R145). Mr. Wagstaff testified that he was worried about returning 
to his job as iet mechanic afte*' USHI'J nic a"»""?' h<n:aus4 'i| ,hiM ^k'cf > t would 
have on him (R188). The actions for which Wagstaff was terminated are 
exactly those this court said would support terminations in the Butler case. 
3 
Mr. Wagstaff suggests, for the first time on appeal, that the Air Force 
should have terminated him forthwith if it was concerned about his drug use. 
The record is clear that as soon as Wagstaff's drug use was discovered the 
Air Force commenced an investigation which culminated in his discharge. 
The applicable regulations authorizes such a delay. Industrial due 
process demands it. 
When the discharge does not occur immediately after the 
employer becomes aware of an offense, a presumption 
arises that there were other reasons for the discharge. 
This relationship between the offense and the discharge 
must be established both as to cause and time. The 
presumption that the conduct was not the cause of the 
discharge may be overcome by a showing that the delay was 
due to such things as investigation, arbitration, or 
hearings conducted with regard to the employee's conduct 
. . . R475-5b-106-2. 
B 
WAGSTAFF WAS A THREAT TO THE GOVERNMENT'S 
STATUS AS A LEADER IN THE DRUG WAR 
Approximately 75% of the 134 pages of exhibits before the ALJ were 
documents establishing the Air Force's absolute intolerance of drugs among 
its employees. (R-ll-24, 46-59, 67-134). Among them were Wagstaff's training 
record showing that he had been in attendance at meetings when the Air Force 
policy on drugs and substance abuse was explained. 
Also among those documents is a copy of Executive Order 12564 wherein 
the President of the United States established a policy that the federal 
government would take the lead in combating drugs (R 23, 24). The Executive 
4 
Order required termination of drug users like Wagstaff. Following the 
Executive Order, Congress passed the National Drug Control Program, 21 USC 
1501, etc. 
As a result of the Executive order and ensuing legislation the rights 
of the federal employer, pertaining to drug offenses, are broader than those 
of any other conceivable employer. The United States Government has waged 
war on drugs on many different fronts. One of the major problem areas 
addressed has been drugs in the military. The record shows that Mr. 
Wagstaff was admonished by the commander of the organization employing him 
that drug involvement would not be tolerated. Those warnings, coupled with 
the United States Government's major offensive on drugs constitute a major 
employer right. The Executive Order establishes national policy by ordering 
certain actions by federal employees and federal employers. In the findings 
section of the Executive Order the President finds that illegal drugs, on or 
off duty, 1. are inconsistent with the public trust placed in federal 
employees, 2. lessen effectiveness of those employees involved, 3. impair 
the efficiency of government employees, and 4. is inconsistent with access 
to sensitive information. Mr. Wagstaff was required to have a security 
clearance and was in the category of people defined by the Executive Order 
to be in sensitive positions. 
The Executive Order directs federal employers, the Air Force included, 
to initiate action to remove offending employees. The employers are 
authorized to proceed on the basis of any appropriate evidence, conviction is 
5 
not required. The offending employees retained their industrial due process 
rights under the Civil Service Reform Act. The Air Force's actions against 
Mr. Wagstaff were required by and comported with Executive Order 12584. 
The Executive Order also issues specific directions to federal 
employees. They are required to refrain from the use of illegal drugs. It 
takes little imagination to envision the public outcry which would arise if 
this federal employer failed to terminate the employment of drug users on 
it's payroll. 
This case must be compared to Clearfield City v. Dept. of Employment 
Sec., 663 P2d 440 (Utah 1983). There an off duty police officer was denied 
benefits after having been charged with sodomy. The court ruled that special 
status of the employer held the employee to a higher standard than might be 
required of other employees. (The policeman was ultimately acquitted of the 
sodomy charge). In citing another case of an employee of the federal 
government the Utah Supreme Court said, at 443, ". . .a public or private 
employer has the right to expect his employees to refrain from acts which 
would bring dishonor on the business name or the institution. . . "The court 
also cited another public employment case denying benefits. "... the 
claimant had deliberately disregarded a statute which his employer had the 
affirmative duty to administer and enforce." The National Drug Control 
Program places such a responsibility upon the United States Department of 
Defense and accordingly upon the Air Force. 
Because the Air Force is expected to be in the vanguard of the war on 
drugs, any drug use by any of its employees is inimical to its purposes and 
6 
termination of such people is necessary to avoid actual or potential harm to 
its interests. 
Accordingly, any Air Force employee, Mr. Wagstaff included, who uses 
drugs is culpable and should be denied benefits if knowledge and control are 
shown. 
II 
AN ADMISSION IS NOT HEARSAY 
Wagstaff argues that the Board must be reversed because its decisions 
had no evidentiary support other than hearsay and cites Yacht Club v. Utah 
Liouor Control Comm. 681 P2d 1224 (Utah 1984). 
In Yacht Club the Supreme Court ruled that though "...the technical 
rules of evidence..." need not be applied in proceedings before 
administrative agencies in Utah. When rules of evidence are applied they are 
the Utah Rule of Evidence, id at 1226. 
A 
WAGSTAFF'S ADMISSIONS ARE NOT HEARSAY 
Rule 801(d)(2) of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides: 
"(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is 
not hearsay if . . . (2) Admission by party-opponent. The 
statement is offered against a party and is (A) his own 
statement, in either his individual or a representative 
capacity, or (B) a statement of which he has manifested 
his adoption or belief in its truth, or (C) a statement by 
a person authorized by him to make a statement concerning 
the subject, or (D) a statement by his agent or servant 
concerning a matter within the scope of his agency or 
employment, made during the existence of the relationship, 
or (E) a statement by a coconspirator of a party during 
the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. 
7 
At the hearing before the ALJ, Mr. Wagstaff was represented by Mr. Joe 
Celli, a union steward. In that hearing both Mr. Celli and Mr. Wagstaff 
acknowledged, at least 16 times, that Mr. Wagstaff had used cocaine as the 
Air Force attested. (R 136, 140, 141, 144, 147, 156, 158, 159, 160, 164, 181, 
183, 184, 187, 188, 190, 192). Each such statement was an admission under 
Rule 801(d)(2) and provided the best of all possible evidence that Mr. 
Wagstaff did in fact use cocaine and then return to work." 
B 
THE OTHER TESTIMONY WAS NOT HEARSAY 
The Air Force also elicited testimony from Wagstaff's supervisor and 
an OSI agent as to statements Wagstaff made to them about his drug use. It 
is clear that the provisions of Rule 801(d)(A) cover each of these 
situations. In U.S. v. Lam Lek Chonq. 544 F2d 58 (2d Cir 1976) cert den. 429 
US 1101, 51 LEd 2d 550, 97 S. Ct. 1124 the court held that such statements, 
though not made in court, are not hearsay and are admissible as an admission 
of a party. See generally 48 ALR Fed 922, Admissions by a party - opponent. 
The hearsay argument is entirely without basis. 
Ill 
WAGSTAFF WAS NOT ENTITLED TO REHABILITATION 
Wagstaff suggests that he was entitled to be rehabilitated rather than 
firede 
A 
ARGUMENTS NOT RAISED BELOW MAY NOT BE RAISED HERE 
At the hearing before the ALJ Mr. Celli started to raise the 
rehabilitation issue. He was reminded by AF Counsel that there was no claim. 
8 
Mr. Wagstaff was an ongoing drug abuser and therefore entitled to 
rehabilitation and Mr. Celli changed his position, (R159). 
In Edgar v. Wagner 572 P2d 405, 407 (Utah 1977) the Utah Supreme Court 
stated the time honored rule of appellate practice that a matter may not be 
raised on appeal for the first time. 
B 
WAGSTAFF WAS NOT ELIGIBLE FOR REHABILITATION 
Wagstaff argues that he was entitled to drug and alcohol rehabilitation 
by virtue of existing AF policy. He suggests that in September 1989 some 
change in policy took place restricting his right to rehabilitation. 
Contrary to Wagstaff7s assertion, no change in policy took place. 
As discussed before the ALJ, Wagstaff claimed he was guilty of a single 
instance of drug use. (R 159). All of AF policies dealing with 
rehabilitation deal with "abusers" i.e., people with an extended history of 
abuse who voluntarily seek assistance in the Air Force Social Actions 
program, CR 16, 47, 93). Mr. Wagstaff is not such a person. 
Further, discretion was left to the commander as to appropriate action 
for first time users (R 12, 79). Mr. Wagstaff, not having been identified 
through random testing, was not eligible for rehabilitation (R 16). 
CONCLUSION 
This issue before the court is, "Was there substantial evidence before 
the Board of Review to allow it to decide as it did?" Mr. Wagstaff admitted 
his use of cocaine during a time frame which insured he would be under its 
influence when he returned to work. The Board reviewed the evidence and 
9 
correctly ruled the termination was for just cause. The decision of the 
Board should be sustained and the Petition for Review denied. 
Dated this />~ day of November, 1990. 
D & V. BENSON 
United States Attorney 
By: Robert H. Wilde 
Special Assistant 
United States Attorney 
10 
35-4-5, Ineligibility for benefits. 
An individual is ineligible for benefits or for purposes of establishing a 
waiting period: 
(a) For the week in which the claimant left work voluntarily without 
good cause, if so found by the commission, and for each week thereafter 
until the claimant has performed services in bona fide, covered employ-
ment and earned wages for those services equal to at least six times the 
claimant's weekly benefit amount. A claimant shall not be denied eligibil-
ity for benefits if the claimant leaves work under circumstances of such a 
nature that it would be contrary to equity and good conscience to impose a 
disqualification. 
The commission shall, in cooperation with the employer, consider for 
the purposes of this chapter the reasonableness of the claimant's actions, 
and the extent to which the actions evidence a genuine continuing attach-
ment to the labor market in reaching a determination of whether the 
ineligibility of a claimant is contrary to equity and good conscience. 
Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, a claimant who 
has left work voluntarily to accompany, follow, or join his or her spouse to 
or in a new locality does so without good cause for purposes of this subsec-
tion. 
(b) (1) For the week in which the claimant was discharged for just 
cause or for an act or omission in connection with employment, not 
constituting a crime, which is deliberate, willful, or wanton and ad-
verse to the employer's rightful interest, if so found by the commis-
sion, and thereafter until the claimant has earned an amount equal 
to at least six times the claimant's weekly benefit amount in bona 
fide covered employment. 
(2) For the week in which he was discharged for dishonesty consti-
tuting a crime or any felony or class A misdemeanor in connection 
with his work as shown by the facts, together with his admission, or 
as shown by his conviction in a court of competent jurisdiction of that 
crime and for the 51 next following weeks and for each week thereaf-
ter until the claimant has performed services in bona fide covered 
employment and earned wages for those services equal to at least six 
times the claimant's weekly benefit amount. If by reason of his al-
24 
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leged dishonesty or crime in connection with his work, the individual 
is held in legal custody or is free on bail, any determination of his 
eligibility shall be held in abeyance pending his release or conviction, 
(c) If the commission finds that the claimant has failed without good 
cause to properly apply for available suitable work, to accept a referral to 
suitable work offered by the employment office, or to accept suitable work 
offered by an employer or the employment office. The ineligibility con-
tinues until the claimant has performed services in bona fide covered 
employment and earned wages for the services in an amount equal to at 
least six times the claimant's weekly benefit amount. A claimant shall 
not be denied eligibility for benefits for failure to apply, accept referral, or 
accept available suitable work under circumstances of such a nature that 
it would be contrary to equity and good conscience to impose a disqualifi-
cation. 
The commission shall consider the purposes of this chapter, the reason-
ableness of the claimant's actions, and the extent to which the actions 
evidence a genuine continuing attachment to the labor market in reach-
ing a determination of whether the ineligibility of a claimant is contrary 
to equity and good conscience. 
(1) In determining whether or not work is suitable for an individ-
ual, the commission shall consider the degree of risk involved to his 
health, safety, and morals, his physical fitness and prior training, his 
prior earnings and experience, his length of unemployment and pros-
pects for securing local work in his customary occupation, the wages 
for similar work in the locality, and the distance of the available 
work from his residence. 
Prior earnings shall be considered on the basis of all four quarters 
used in establishing eligibility and not just the earnings from the 
most recent employer. The commission shall be more prone to find 
work as suitable the longer the claimant has been unemployed and 
the less likely the prospects are to secure local work in his customary 
occupation. 
(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, no work is 
suitable, and benefits shall not be denied under this chapter to any 
otherwise eligible individual for refusing to accept new work under 
any of the following conditions: 
(i) if the position offered is vacant due directly to a strike, 
lockout, or other labor dispute; 
(ii) if the wages, hours, or other conditions of the work offered 
are substantially less favorable to the individual than those pre-
vailing for similar work in the locality; or 
(iii) if as a condition of being employed the individual would 
be required to join a company union or to resign from or refrain 
from joining any bona fide labor organization, 
(d) For any week in which the commission finds that his unemploy-
ment is due to a stoppage of work which exists because of a strike involv-
ing his grade, class, or group of workers at the factory or establishment at 
which he is or was last employed. 
(1) If the commission finds that a strike has been fomented by a 
worker of any employer, none of the workers of the grade, class, or 
group of workers of the individual who is found to be a party to the 
25 
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plan, or agreement to foment a strike, shall be eligible for benefits. 
However, if the commission finds that the strike is caused by the 
failure or refusal of any employer to conform to the provisions of any 
law of the state of Utah or of the United States pertaining to hours, 
wages, or other conditions of work, the strike shall not render the 
workers ineligible for benefits. 
(2) If the commission finds that the employer, his agent or repre-
sentative has conspired, planned, or agreed with any of his workers, 
their agents or representatives to foment a strike, that strike shall 
not render the workers ineligible for benefits. 
(3) A worker may receive benefits if, subsequent to his unemploy-
ment because of a strike as defined in Subsection (d), he has obtained 
employment and has been paid wages of not less than the amount 
specified in Subsection 35-4-3(d) and has worked as specified in Sub-
section 35-4-4(f). During the existence of the stoppage of work due to 
this strike the wages of the worker used for the determination of his 
benefit rights shall not include any wages he earned from the em-
ployer involved in the strike. 
(e) For each week with respect to which the claimant willfully made a 
false statement or representation or knowingly failed to report a material 
fact to obtain any benefit under the provisions of this chapter, and an 
additional 13 weeks for the first week the statement or representation 
was made or fact withheld and six weeks for each week thereafter; the 
additional weeks not to exceed 49 weeks. The additional period shall 
commence on the Sunday following the issuance of a determination find-
ing the claimant in violation of this subsection. Each individual found in 
violation of this subsection shall repay to the commission the amount of 
benefits the claimant actually received and, as a civil penalty, an amount 
equal to the benefits the claimant received by direct reason of his fraud. 
The penalty amount shall be regarded as any other penalty under this 
chapter. These amounts shall be collectible by civil action or warrant in 
the manner provided in Subsections 35-4-17(c) and (e). A claimant is 
ineligible for future benefits or waiting week credit, and any wage credits 
earned by the claimant shall be unavailable for purposes of paying bene-
fits, if any amount owed under this subsection remains unpaid. 
Determinations under this subsection shall be made only upon a sworn 
written admission of the claimant or after due notice and recorded hear-
ing. If a claimant waives the recorded hearing, a determination shall be 
made based upon all the facts which the commission, exercising due dili-
gence, has obtained. Determinations by the commission are appealable in 
the manner provided by this chapter for appeals from other benefit deter-
minations. 
(f) For any week with respect to which or a part of which he has re-
ceived or is seeking unemployment benefits under an unemployment 
compensation law of another state or the United States. If the appropriate 
agency of the other state or of the United States finally determines that 
he is not entitled to those unemployment benefits, this disqualification 
does not apply. 
(g) (1) For any week in which he is registered at and attending an 
established school, or is on vacation during or between successive 
quarters or semesters of school attendance, unless the major portion 
26 
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of his wages for insured work during his base period was for services 
performed while attending school. Notwithstanding the foregoing 
provisions of this subsection, an otherwise eligible individual is not 
ineligible to receive benefits while attending a part-time training 
course. An otherwise eligible individual shall not be denied benefits 
for any week because he is in training with the approval of the com-
mission, and that individual is not ineligible to receive benefits by 
reason of nonavailability for work, failure to search for work, refusal 
of suitable work, or failure to apply for or to accept suitable work 
with respect to any week he is in training with the approval of the 
commission. 
(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, no other-
wise eligible individual shall be denied benefits for any week because 
he is in training approved under Section 236(a)< 1) of the Trade Act of 
1974, nor shall he be denied benefits for leaving work to enter that 
training, provided the work left is not suitable employment, or be-
cause of the application to any such week in training of provisions in 
this law or any applicable federal unemployment compensation law 
relating to availability for work, active search for work, or refusal to 
accept work. 
For purposes of this subsection, ''suitable employment" means 
work of a substantially equal or higher skill level than the individ-
ual's past adversely affected employment, as defined for purposes of 
the Trade Act of 1974, and wages for that work at not less than 80% 
of the individual's average weekly wage as determined for the pur-
poses of the Trade Act of 1974. 
(h) For any week with respect to which he is receiving, has received, or 
is entitled to receive remuneration in the form of: 
(1) wages in lieu of notice, or a dismissal or separation payment; or 
(2) accrued vacation or terminal leave payment. 
If the remuneration is less than the benefits which would otherwise be 
due, he is entitled to receive for that week, if otherwise eligible, benefits 
reduced as provided in Subsection 35-4-3(CJ. 
(i) (1) For any week in which the individual's benefits are based on 
service for an educational institution in an instructional, research, or 
principal administrative capacity and which begins during the period 
between two successive academic years, or during a similar period 
between two regular terms, whether or not successive, or during a 
period of paid sabbatical leave provided for in the individual's con-
tract if the individual performs services in the first of those academic 
years or terms and if there is a contract or reasonable assurance that 
the individual will perform services in any such capacity for an edu-
cational institution in the second of the academic years or terms. 
(2) For any week in which the individual's benefits are based on 
service in any other capacity for an educational institution, and 
which week begins during a period between two successive academic 
years or terms if the individual performs those services in the first of 
the academic years or terms and there is a reasonable assurance that 
the individual will perform the services in the second of the academic 
years or terms. If compensation is denied to any individual under this 
subsection and the individual was not offered an opportunity to per-
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form such services for the educational institution for the second of 
such academic years or terms, the individual shall be entitled to a 
retroactive payment of compensation for each week for which the 
individual filed a timely claim for compensation and for which com-
pensation was denied solely by reason of this subsection. 
(3) With respect to any services described in Subsection <i)(l) or 
(2), compensation payable on the basis of those services shall be de-
nied to an individual for any week which commences during an es-
tablished and customary vacation period or holiday recess if the indi-
vidual performs the services in the period immediately before the 
vacation period or holiday recess, and there is a reasonable assurance 
that the individual will perform the services in the period immedi-
ately following the vacation period or holiday recess. 
(4) With respect to services described in Subsection (i)(l) or (2), 
compensation payable on the basis of those services as provided in 
Subsection (i)(l), (2), or (3) shall be denied to an individual who 
performed those services in an educational institution while in the 
employ of an educational service agency. For purposes of this Subsec-
tion fi)(4), "educational service agency" means a governmental 
agency or entity established and operated exclusively for the purpose 
of providing the services described in Subsection (i)(l) or (2) to an 
educational institution. 
Benefits based on service in employment defined in Subsections 
35-4-22(j)(2)(D) and (E) are payable in the same amount, on the same 
terms and subject to the same conditions as compensation payable on the 
basis of other service subject to this chapter. 
fj) For any week which commences during the period between two suc-
cessive sport seasons or similar periods if the individual performed any 
services, substantially all of which consists of participating in sports or 
athletic events or training or preparing to participate in the first of those 
seasons or similar periods and there is a reasonable assurance that indi-
vidual will perform those services in the later of the seasons or similar 
periods. 
(k) (1) For any week in which the benefits are based upon services 
performed by an alien, unless the alien is an individual who has been 
lawfully admitted for permanent residence at the time the services 
were performed, was lawfully present for purposes of performing the 
services or, was permanently residing in the United States under 
color of law at the time the services were performed, including an 
alien who is lawfully present in the United States as a result of the 
application of Subsection 203(a)(7) or Subsection 212(d)(5) of the Im-
migration and Nationality Act. 
(2) Any data or information required of individuals applying for 
benefits to determine whether benefits are not payable to them be-
cause of their alien status shall be uniformly required from all appli-
cants for benefits. 
(3) In the case of an individual whose application for benefits 
would otherwise be approved, no determination that benefits to the 
individual are not payable because of his alien status shall be made 
except upon a preponderance of the evidence. 
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The employer, Department of the A i r Force, appeals the decision 
of the Administ rat ive Law Judge which held tha t the c la imant , Dennis L. 
Magstaff, had been discharged from h is employment wi th the employer fo r 
reasons that are not d i squa l i f y i ng under §35-4-5(5) (1) of the Utah Employ-
ment Securi ty Act. The ALJ therefore allowed payment of unemployment 
benef i ts to the c la imant . 
A f te r careful considerat ion of the record in t h i s matter, the 
Board of Review concludes that the claimant was discharged by the employer 
f o r reasons that are d isqua l i f y ing under §35-4-5(5) (1) of the Act . The 
Board therefore reverses the p r io r decis ion of the ALJ and denies benef i ts 
to the claimant e f f ec t i ve January 28, 1990, and continuing u n t i l he has 
worked in bona f i de covered employment and earned wages equal to at least 
six times his weekly bene f i t amount and is otherwise e l i g i b l e . An overpay-
ment in the amount of $4,449 is establ ished pursuant to §35-4-6(e) of the 
Act and w i l l be deducted from fu tu re benef i ts otherwise due the claimant. 
In so ho ld ing, the Board of Review adopts the f indings of fac t and conclu-
sions of law of the Admin is t ra t ive Law Judge to the extent tha t the same 
are not inconsistent wi th the addi t iona l f indings and reasoning of the 
Board of Review noted belcw. 
In reviewing the record in t h i s case, the Board of Review notes 
the fo l lowing sequence of events which i t f inds as addi t ional facts i n 
the case: 
1 . The OSI report states tha t "On 27 Jul 89, 0C-1, a source 
of unknown r e l i a b i l i t y , re lated tha t SUBJECT [Mr. Wagstaff] and other 
Di rectorate of Maintenance employees, s p e c i f i c a l l y , NEVIN SHELDON, JAMES 
VALDEZ, and LEWIS SAVAGE were using cocaine i n Bay 5, Bldg 1917, HAFB, UT." 
2 . On October 27, 1989, Mr. Wagstaff t o ld his supervisor, Lee 
Stephenson, that he was nervous because Sheldon was arrested on October 27th 
f o r cocaine use. Mr. Wagstaff feared Sheldon would impl icate him and he 
would subsequently be ar rested. Mr. Wagstaff t o l d Mr. Stephenson he was 
w i l l i n g t o ta lk to the OSI and Mr. Stephenson took him over to ta lk to the 
OSI. 
3. On November 1 , 1989, Mr. Wagstaff was interviewed by the OSI 
at which time he admitted that i n June or July 1989, he used cocaine with 
three other ind iv idua ls at a park i n C lea r f i e l d during t h e i r lunch break. 
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4. While the OSI inves t iga t ion was being conducted, the items 
being worked on by Mr. Wagstaff and everyone else who had been implicated 
in the use of i l l e g a l drugs were being watched very closely to ensure that 
the work was properly done. 
5. The c la imant 's supervisor, Lee Stephenson, received the OSI 
report on January 5, 1990 and issued the Notice of Proposed Removal to 
Mr. Wagstaff on January 12, 1990. Mr. Stephenson was not in a posi t ion 
to take act ion against the claimant u n t i l the OSI inves t iga t ion had been 
completed and he had received the report . The OSI i nves t i ga t i on was a 
complex inves t iga t ion invo lv ing many i nd i v i dua l s , the use of con f ident ia l 
informants, and covert i nves t iga t i ve techniques such as videotaping i n d i -
viduals without t h e i r knowledge. 
A person who uses cocaine may experience a high tha t i n i t i a l l y 
lasts anywhere from 20 minutes to an hour and a hal f with a residual e f fec t 
tha t las ts fo r several hours. 
REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
The Board of Review adopts the reasoning and conclusions of law 
of the ALJ to the extent the same are not inconsistent with the reasoning 
of the Board of Review which fo l lows. Spec i f i ca l l y , the Board of Review 
adopts the ALJ's reasoning and conclusions of law respecting the elements 
of knowledge and contro l but reaches i t s own conclusions regarding the 
element of c u l p a b i l i t y . 
The Unemployment Insurance Rule on Proximal Cause - Relat ion of 
Offenses to Discharge, R475-5b-106-2 of the Utah Administ rat ive Code states 
as fo l lows: 
When the discharge does not occur immediately a f t e r 
the employer becomes aware of an of fense, a presump-
t i o n ar ises tha t there were other reasons fo r the 
discharge. This re la t ionsh ip between the offense and 
the discharge must be established both as to cause 
and t ime. The presumption that the conduct was not 
the cause of the discharge may be overcome by a show-
ing that the delay was due to such things as inves-
t i g a t i o n , a r b i t r a t i o n , or hearings conducted wi th 
regard to the employee's conduct. . . . 
The Board of Review found t h i s to be a very close case because of 
the substant ia l span of t ime between the claimant 's misconduct of using 
cocaine whi le on a lunch break, the time the A i r Force f i r s t learned the 
claimant may be involved in such conduct, the time the A i r Force confirmed 
by the claimant 's admission in November that he had used the cocaine during 
his lunch break, and the time that the employer f i n a l l y took act ion to 
terminate the c la imant 's employment in January, 1990. Such substant ial 
time spans cause a presumption to ar ise under the above-cited Unemployment 
Insurance Rul e on proximal cause tha t there were other reasons fo r the 
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cla imant 's discharge because the discharge did not occur immediately a f te r 
the employer became aware of the of fense. The Board of Review f i n d s , 
however, t ha t the A i r Force has overcome t h i s presumption by showing tha t 
the delay was due to the OSI inves t iga t ion that was being conducted in the 
matter. I t is c lear from the record tha t the OSI was tak ing the matter 
yery ser ious ly and was not simply ignor ing the information which they had 
wi th respect to the c la imant 's use of cocaine and possibly other i l l e g a l 
drugs. 
The Board of Review notes tha t the A i r Force's d rug- tes t ing po l icy 
is not an issue in t h i s case as the claimant was not discharged for t es t i ng 
pos i t i ve to drugs. Rather, he was discharged based on the OSI report which 
i d e n t i f i e d him as a drug user both on and o f f base. Because the A i r Force 
did not ca l l as witnesses the former fe l low workers of the claimant who had 
i d e n t i f i e d him as using drugs on and o f f base, much of the OSI report i s 
hearsay evidence as i t re la tes to Mr. Wagstaff's claim f o r unemployment 
bene f i t s . The claimant d id admit, however, that he used cocaine with three 
of his fonner fel low employees while o f f base during his hal f -hour lunch 
break a f te r they had f i r s t stopped to purchase food at a fas t food ou t le t 
and took i t to a park to consume,, Based on those sequences of events, i t 
i s inev i tab le that the use of the cocaine was immediately p r i o r to return ing 
to base and that the claimant returned to base under the in f luence of the 
cocaine. 
In the case of Dept. of the A i r Force v. Dept. of Employment 
Secur i ty , 786 P,2d 1361 and 125 Utah Adv* Rep. 54, 57 (Utah App. 1990), the 
Utah Court of Appeals, a f t e r f i r s t s ta t ing tha t the A i r Force had f a i l e d to 
show in tha t case how the c la imant 's conduct in se l l i ng drugs o f f base 
during nonduty hours had adversely affected i t s r igh ts as an employer, 
stated in footnote number th ree : 
We agree w i t h A i r Force that i t s in te res t in prevent-
ing drug use among i t s workforce is paramount. This 
i n te res t is especial ly imperative considering the 
sens i t i ve nature of Bu t le r ' s a c t i v i t i e s as an a i r -
c r a f t mechanic working on m u l t i - m i l l i o n do l l a r a i r -
c r a f t . See e . g . , Johnson, 121 Utah Adv. Rep. at 29 
(a goverrment contractor in the business of bu i ld ing 
nat ional defense products has a par t i cu la r i n te res t 
i n maintaining a drug-free workplace to prevent 
nat ional secur i t y t h r e a t s ) . The issue before us , 
however, i s how But ler 's se l l i ng cocaine o f f base 
and during o f f duty hours a f fec ts A i r Force's r i g h t -
ful in te res t * 
Thus, the Utah Court of Appeals has recognized the A i r Force's 
leg i t imate in te res t i n preventing drug use among i t s workforce. The c la im-
ant has admitted drug use in t h i s case. While the admitted use took place 
o f f base, the circumstances are such tha t i t i s inev i tab le tha t the claimant 
was s t i l l under the e f fec ts of the i l l i c i t cocaine at the time he returned 
to work fo l lowing his lunch break. 
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The di ssenting member of the Board of Review considers the 
admitted incident of drug usage to be an iso lated incident of poor judgment 
which should not d i squa l i f y the claimant from receiving unemployment 
bene f i t s . The major i ty of the Board of Review is not e n t i r e l y pursuaded 
that the incident of drug usage which the claimant admits was the isolated 
inc ident he claims i t to be. Even i f i t was an isolated i nc i den t , con-
sider ing the sens i t ive nature of the employer's mission, the claimant's 
respons ib i l i t y to work on m u l t i - m i l l i o n do l l a r a i r c r a f t and the rel iance of 
those who f l y such a i r c r a f t on the mechanics who repair them, the Board of 
Review cannot f i nd the employer's stated pol icy of zero tolerance for drug 
abuse to be unreasonable. The Board of Review therefore concludes that the 
A i r Force has establ ished the element of cu lpab i l i t y in t h i s case as well 
as the elements of knowledge and control and has therefore establ ished jus t 
cause for the c la imant 's discharge. 
This decis ion becomes f i na l on the date i t is mai led, and any 
fu r the r appeal must be made wi th in 30 days from the date of ma i l i ng . Your 
appeal must be submitted in w r i t i ng to the Utah Court of Appeals, Midtown 
Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Suite 400, Salt Lake C i ty , Utah 84102. To 
f i l e an appeal w i th the Court of Appeals, you must submit to the Clerk of 
the Court a Pe t i t i on f o r Writ of Review se t t ing fo r th the reasons for 
appeal, pursuant to §63-46b-16 of the Utah Administrat ive Procedures Act 
and Rule 14 of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, fol lowed by a 
Docketing Statement and a Legal Br ie f as required by Rules 9 and 24-27, 
Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
/ s / Stephen M. Hadley 
/ s / James F. Hannan 
I d issent . I would a f f i rm the decision of the Administ rat ive Law 
Judge. The claimant in t h i s case has been employed by the A i r Force for 12 
years. As noted by the ALJ in his f indings of f ac t , the claimant has not 
been charged w i th any cr iminal v i o l a t i on of the law. He had received no 
previous warnings from his employer re la t i ng to his job performance and had 
consistent ly received above sat is fac tory performance appra isa ls . When 
interviewed by the 0SI on November 1st, the claimant vo l un ta r i l y provided 
a urine sample to be drug tes ted . His urine tested negative fo r any drug 
metabol i tes. I consider t h i s case to come wi th in Unemployment Insurance 
Rule R475-5b-102- l .a . ( l ) o f the Utah Administrat ive Code which provides 
as fo l lows: 
Longevity and p r i o r work record are important in 
determining i f the act or omission i s an iso lated 
inc ident or a good f a i t h er ror in judgment. An 
employee who has h i s t o r i c a l l y complied with work 
rules does not demonstrate by a s ingle v i o l a t i o n , 
even though harmfu l , that such v io la t ions w i l l be 
repeated and therefore require discharge to avoid 
fu ture harm to the employer. . . . 
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In my opinion, the claimant clearly used poor judgment in "going 
along with the boys" in using cocaine on one occasion during a lunch break 
in June or July of 1989. Such conduct is a matter of serious concern to the 
employer which may j u s t i f y substantial disciplinary action. However, in my 
opinion, the snployer overreacted in discharging the claimant for th is 
single incident of poor judgment. The claimant's entire career should not 
be destroyed as a result of such a single incident. 
/ s / Connie Meske-Nielsen 
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